Captain

CONFIDENTIAL
R.
T.D.139/1688
9th February, 1943

SHIPPING CASUALTIES SECTION - TRADE DIVISION

REPORT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MASTER,
CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. WILLIAMSON
m.v. 'TOWER GRANGE' - 5,226 g.t.
INDEPENDENT
SUNK BY ONE TORPEDO FROM U-BOAT ON
18th NOVEMBER, 1942

All times in Local Time +3 1/2 hours for G.M.T.

CAPTAIN W.H. WILLIAMSON:
We sailed from Capetown bound for Trinidad with a cargo of 8,500 tons of general cargo, including 1,800 tons of Mineral Ores. The ship was armed with one 4" gun, one Oerlikon, two Twin Marlins, two Twin Hotchkiss, four Lewis guns, two P.A.C. Rockets and three Depth Charges. The crew numbered 47, including four Naval and seven Military Gunners, of these, 6 are missing, including the 3rd and 6th Engineers, and one Naval and one Military Gunner. The Wireless books were thrown overboard in a weighted box, while the Confidential Codes, kept in weighted boxes in the Chart Room, went down with the ship. Degaussing was off.

2. We left Capetown at 0800 on the 27th October and proceeded independently, as routed by the N.C.S.O., for Trinidad. We continued without incident until some miles off Cape St. Roque, South America, when I received a diversion signal ordering me to proceed to position R.G., but when 180 miles off this position, another diversion was received, this time to a position about 5 1/2° N. 34° W., after which I was to rejoin the original track along the coast of South America. My instructions from the Admiralty were to report my position every three days, and accordingly the Senior Wireless Operator transmitted the necessary message to the Admiralty at dusk every third day. On the 14th November this transmission also contained a report of an unidentified sailing craft sighted during the day. I sighted an exceptionally "white" sail to the Northward at about 1600, which appeared to be much too "white" to belong to a lifeboat, also I could not see anything of a hull of this ship. I immediately put it astern, altering course to 90° to do so. As soon as the alteration was made the sail disappeared.

3. I continued without incident until 0300 on the 18th November, when in position 6° 20'N. 49°10'W (shown on map, right)., steaming at 11 1/2 knots, zig-zagging on pattern No. 3, on a course of 270° (Approx) we were struck by a torpedo. The weather was fine, and visibility good, the moon being within half an hour of setting. There was a moderate sea and slight swell, wind East South Easterly, force 4.

4. The track of the torpedo was seen approaching from about one point abaft the port beam, only a second before it struck the ship in the engine room on the port side. At the time I was in the middle of an alteration of course being half way over on the 40° turn to starboard, consequently the ship was swinging away from the direction from which the torpedo was fired. I heard a double explosion, the first appeared to be from the torpedo striking the ship, while a second later there was a very loud explosion as the torpedo exploded in the engine room. A large column of water was thrown up, which cascaded over the bridge and after deck. None of the crew saw any flash, nor was there any smell after the explosion.

5. The engines were immediately put out of action and all electricity failed, the ship being plunged into darkness. No. 4 lifeboat was completely blown away by the explosion, which threw heavy water over the after deck. Several shell plates on the port side abreast the engine room were badly buckled. The ship immediately listed to port, the list increasing to about 30° in 10 minutes, but she remained on an even keel.

6. I was asleep in my cabin but was awakened by the explosion. I immediately rushed up to the Bridge, meeting the 2nd Officer on the way down, he informed me that he had already ordered the man from the wheel to his boat station. I hurried to the Wireless Room and found that the 2nd Wireless Operator was in the process of transmitting an S.O.S. message. I then went to the boat deck and found the Chief Officer had cleared No. 2 lifeboat, although this boat, being on the port side, had been damaged, but it was successfully lowered, in spite of the list. However, on reaching the water this boat sank and was not seen again, nobody was in it at the time. I supervised the lowering of No. 1 lifeboat, then returned to the Wireless Room, and found that the Senior Wireless Operator had taken over from the 2nd Operator. Apparently the Receiving Set was damaged and was out of action, but after testing the transmitter on the D/F apparatus he found that it was in working order and an S.O.S. was sent out.

7. I collected some charts from the chart room before going to the boat deck. Both the starboard lifeboats, Nos. 1 and 3, were now in the water and 4 men, the 3rd Officer, an Apprentice, the Cook and myself were the only ones left on board. The cook suggested that we should release the raft in the fore-rigging on the starboard side, but as the list had increased to 35° by this time the raft jammed so I told the 3 men to jump over the side, following them a few seconds later at about 0312. The boats were not able to remain alongside owing to the condition of the sea, consequently they pulled a few yards away from the ship, as quickly as possible. I swam toward No. 3 after starboard lifeboat, but finding I could not make it, I turned and swam towards No. 1 boat. On reaching it I found it capsized with 5 men sitting astride the keel. About this time I saw the Oerlikon Gun on the bridge disappearing, as the ship sank, rolling slowly over to starboard, but still on an even keel at 0315. I cannot account for this lifeboat capsizing as it had a capacity for 10 men and only had 5 men in it at the time. I can only put it down to the condition of the sea together with the wash from the ship as she sank.

8. I learned later that No. 3 lifeboat which had 40 of the crew in it, also capsized. This boat was certainly overloaded, with 40 men, having capacity for only 30. When I saw this lifeboat at 0330 she had been righted, but was still water-logged. 4 of the crew were lost owing to this incident. At about 0320 I heard a loud explosion which I think was the boilers exploding. By 0330 we had managed to right No. 1 lifeboat and 6 men climbed into it in spite of its water-logged condition. I saw some rafts in the vicinity and secured three of them to No. 1 lifeboat. I transferred some men from No. 1 boat on to the rafts whilst this boat was being bailed out. When dry the men returned to the boat. I saw a 4th raft which had been damaged with one tank stove in, and part of the frame work broken. I had lost sight of No. 3 lifeboat, but managed to collect another 8 men from the different rafts. Several of these men stated that they had seen the submarine on the surface near the ship, but she made no effort to come near their rafts. I personally did not see anything of the submarine.

9. I transferred all the food, water and gear from the damaged raft and at 0600, as dawn was breaking, I sighted No. 3 lifeboat. She was under oars and making her way slowly towards my collection of craft. After pulling alongside, most of her crew got on to the rafts and bailed out their boat. I then sighted the 5th and last raft about 1/2 a mile away with two men on it. I put 4 of my crew on to one of my rafts and told them to paddle over and tow the 5th raft back. The Carpenter and one Army Gunner were on this raft. The Chief Officer and I had a conference in No. 3 lifeboat, when it was finally agreed that the Chief Officer should take charge of No. 1 boat with 10 men, while I took charge of No. 3 boat with 29 men in it. I gave the Chief Officer the choice of his men, he took the Bosun and several very good Able Seamen. The Boat's Wireless Set was in No. 3 lifeboat when it capsized, it had become saturated and would not work. The Senior Wireless Operator said that as the Receiving Set was also badly damaged by sea water he threw it overboard, but the Transmitting set was kept and handed into the Ministry of War Transport at Trinidad.

10. After collecting the provisions from the rafts they were divided between the two lifeboats. I decided to set a course for the nearest point of land which I reckoned to be Cape Orange – French Guinea – about 180 miles distant. I proposed to steer S.W. (True) as nearly as possible. At 1300 on the 18th November the boats set sail, keeping together until 1700 on the 20th November. The weather was squally with wind from the East South East, I was forced to steer W.N.W. The Chief Officer in his small boat was obliged to ride to his sea anchor during this storm, consequently we soon lost contact and I did not see his boat again. We had arranged to burn flares each morning and night to enable us to keep together, but no flare was seen after 1700 on the 20th November. The red lights in my boat were saturated, therefore I was unable to show him one. During the night the weather improved and we were able to resume a S.W. course again. On the 21st November I noticed a shark closely following the boat. Our stern post had been damaged when the boat was thrown against the ship's side, I was very anxious about it as this shark frequently hit the stern of the boat with its tail. I finally managed to drive the shark away by hitting it on the head with a hammer.

11. At 2200 on the 22nd November the smoke of a vessel was sighted. We steered towards it and gradually picked up the loom of a ship, bearing about S.S.E. apparently bound west, crossing our course. I decided to risk sending a morse message, so the 2nd Radio Officer rigged a red life jacket light and signalled an S.O.S. message. I ordered the following message to be sent:- "GMJW TOWER GRANGE if you are unable to pick me up please give bearing and distance to the nearest station as I am running short of water". This signal was sent but was not acknowledged, so I told the Gunners to blow their whistles, as this vessel was now only about 500 yards away. The vessel hauled away under port helm, bringing my boat right astern, then to our utter amazement we saw a flash, followed by a report from his after gun. A second shot followed almost at once. I immediately altered course away from the mysterious ship, as she was firing at point blank range. A third shot passed directly over the boat falling into the sea about 200 yards away. The fourth shell which followed landed 100 yards from us, but we thought the end had come as the whine from the 5th shell came dangerously near, but I do not know where this one landed. By this time the vessel had altered course and appeared to be steaming away from us. As nothing further occurred I resumed my S.W. course and gave the crew a tot of brandy mixed with water to settle their nerves. I regretted having been so generous with the brandy as I found that it made them very thirsty.

12. During the 23rd November the sky cleared with a light south east breeze, but by noon a pitiless sun was beating down making several of the crew restless and somewhat distressed. The 2nd Officer obtained a rough sight which indicated that the boat had been set to the Eastward. By his latitude we appeared to be south of the coastline for which I had reckoned to make, so I decided to alter course to West North West. Within a few minutes of altering course we sighted a vessel on our port quarter. This ship was zig zagging, and I could not quite make up my mind what to do. After their recent experience the crew were apprehensive and suggested that I should not do anything to attract her attention as they were not anxious to be fired at again. Finally I decided to steer a converging course and we gradually closed her. I ordered the men to stand up and wave their shirts, as there was only a red patch on our sail to attract attention. This vessel altered course towards us, she was the CASTALIA. She picked us up at 1445 on the 23rd November, 1942, after we had been 5 days in the lifeboat, during which time we had made 130 miles. The CASTALIA took our lifeboat in board and resumed her course for Trinidad, where we arrived on the 27th November.

13. On arriving at Trinidad I was interviewed by the American Naval Authorities and told them that there was still one lifeboat adrift. They promised to send a flying boat out immediately to search for this lifeboat. On the 28th November I reported to the British Naval Authorities, and mentioned that my other lifeboat was still missing. Lieutenant Miller, in charge said to me "The question is, where to look" I took great exception to this remark as he knew the time and position in which the ship had been sunk. However I was greatly relieved to learn during the following day that this lifeboat had been picked up by the BARON BELHAVEN on the 25th November, and the crew were landed at Trinidad.

14. I returned to the United Kingdom in the CASTALIA landing at Methil on the 31st January, 1943. All my crew returned with me except the Chief Officer, who was suffering from sun burn and was left behind in hospital at Trinidad.

15. During the 5 days in the lifeboat we experienced good weather, the sun was very hot during the day but none of the crew, except the Chief Officer appeared to have suffered from it. We began the trip in my boat with 17 gallons of water, one 10 gallon tank from a raft which had become salted by the sea water. I emptied this water out but kept the tank in case it was required for rain water. I rationed the water to 6 oz. a day in 3 doses, and there was ample food for a long trip. The men liked the pemmican spread on their biscuits. Fortunately there were two tins of fruit and some bully beef in each lifeboat and we could have lasted for a considerable time had it been necessary.

16. All my crew behaved extremely well throughout the whole of this trying period and I would specially mention the 2nd Engineer G. Soans, Sailor W. H. Coulson, Bombadier Bridge, A. B. Gunlayer, R. N., K. J. Taylor, Steward H. G. Venter and 2nd Cook D. Taylor, for the calm behaviour and great assistance rendered to me throughout.